Friday, April 1, 2011

Effective Tips to Succeed in Poem Publishing

As the traditional book publishing industry becomes warier of risk and more dedicated to sure-thing titles by celebrity authors, movie tie-ins, and self-help books, poets in particular can find it hard to find a foothold.

While artistic success in poetry might simply lie in the writing itself, commercial success can be trickier to achieve. For the poet, the dream of keeping pace with best-selling authors like J.K. Rowling, John Grisham, and Danielle Steel may be an aspiration that's hard to reach. This doesn't mean that poets cannot find success in publishing poetry, though; success can be achieved by marketing in the right way to the right people.

Nurturing an audience hungry for published poetry

For many poets, the joy of poetry is in the expression itself. Others find that sharing their poems with an appreciative audience brings a heightened sense of fulfillment.

The poet seeking to market their writing must be willing to search out and find their audience, an audience hungry for poetry. A strong DIY ethic serves the poet well in accomplishing this task. Promoting on a "grassroots" level is often the best way for an aspiring poet to find their niche audience, which is frequently a group of other writers who share a passion for poetry.

While self-publishing is the poet's greatest tool when it comes to getting published, traditional publishing can still play a role in building an audience. If a poet is lucky enough to be accepted by a large-scale, traditional publisher, the accomplishment should be celebrated. It's an invaluable accomplishment to build on. The downside is that in the industry, poetry books do not receive much in the way of a marketing push. In the gambler's game of publishing, publishers stack their odds by putting all of their marketing efforts towards a few selected titles in hopes of creating bestsellers, while leaving a sea of titles neglected. Unfortunately, the bestselling titles are rarely collections of poetry.

Instead of becoming frustrated by large national publications, concentrate locally. In addition to self-publishing, small or regional literary publications are the most sensible places to submit works if you're looking to publish traditionally. Not only will you have a much greater chance of being accepted, but other networking opportunities can arrive. Through small-scale local publishing you can begin building an audience. Additionally, these publications often include classified listings for local and online writer's groups.

Writer's groups can provide a supportive environment and constructive criticism, both which can help refine the poet's skills and voice. Sharing work with peers is satisfying to many poets, and will provide a diversity of opinions and advice. Poets who have trouble finding a local group can turn to technology to find a community. Search for writer's groups on Facebook or find other writer's forums and start social networking with other authors. Online writer's forums can provide valuable connections and feedback as well, but unfortunately, they lack the face-to-face contact that offers the poet the best chance to see how their words affect others.

Poem Publishing for the DIY Poet

The rise of self-publishing technology has given writers, poets, and artists with niche audiences more control over their own destiny. For the first time in history, the tools of the publishing industry are available to writers everywhere. Instead of a small number of people deciding what gets printed and what doesn't, anyone who has the will to write has the freedom to pursue publication.

Poets in particular stand to gain greatly from the ongoing development of self-publishing and new publishers. One such publisher is Wordclay, an online publisher where authors can publish books for free. A poet can now create an attractive, professional presentation of their work, and make it available to the audience they have worked so hard to cultivate.

By combining the new technology and freedom offered through self-publishers and using a grassroots mentality to develop a niche audience, poets can enjoy the success of book publishing along with the pop-fiction novelist.

About the Author

http://www.wordclay.com

Sunday, January 2, 2011

Strategy For Action

Let me finish the story where I began, in Afghanistan. Returning from Kabul and, in January 2008, debriefing special advisors, officials and senior officers in No. 10 and Whitehall was a sobering experience. The content of my message was simple: there was no overarching strategy to guide the campaign; we needed one and this is what it could look like.
But my message fell on deaf ears and for two reasons. First, some felt I was wrong about the lack of strategy and pointed out the error of my ways by referring me to 'our strategy'. They were referring to, of course, a British strategy not a coalition strategy. To me the idea of a British strategy seemed then -- and seems now -- nonsensical. How was a British strategy, focused largely on directing a relatively small British deployment, in overall coalition terms, to just one of Afghanistan's thirty-four provinces going to make up for the lack of an overall campaign strategy? Second, I had not recognized that, because British forces were in Helmand Province, the minds of British politicians, senior officers, officials, opinion-formers and the press had become fixated there too. I had failed, in other words, to complete the first step in my Strategic Estimate and understand properly the peculiar political context to which I was returning. Having done my best to bring the key strategic message back, I watched the raging debates about the tactical issues such as equipment and the number of boots on the ground with much private frustration. But the positive outcome was a reinforcement in my mind of the need for new thinking on making strategy. This book is, in part, a consequence of that frustration and of that reinforcement.
As I write now, Afghanistan and Iraq are still playing out, arguably two individual campaigns of a more complex political contest where international terrorism, inspired by extremist Islam, is both a symptom and a tactic. Elsewhere, contemporary developments in North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Georgia and Gaza give pause for thought. Layered over all this is an unprecedented economic crisis. Within this crisis, we see signs that our Western order, perhaps ultimately founded on affluence, may not be as secure as we had assumed. And ultimately the long-term iceberg out there for our Titanic of international politics looks to be global warming. The new international context looks volatile and history may yet have more mileage than Fukuyama predicted. All of this gives me reason to be cautious about our strategic future. We would surely do well to place a premium on our ability to create and, if necessary, execute superior strategy.
I have defined politico-military strategy as a rational course of action that uses state power to achieve a political object in the face of violent opposition. And I have outlined some of the key features present in superior strategy: a clear statement of political purpose, a coherent organizing concept, a sense of seizing the initiative, a capacity to bind key actors, and so on. But ultimately, when you seek out a piece of real strategy, to see what it looks, feels and smells like, you find something that is inherently organic in nature; something that lives. It is, to use my earlier phrase, 'the ideas, judgments and decisions of men and women, set out in a coherent and a communicable form which, in broad terms, answers the critical question: "How are we going to do this?"'
And when all is said and done, what seems to determine the quality of your strategy making and strategic performance is the quality of your people. Superior strategy making is all about clear strategic thinking and decisive strategic leadership. The key is to have people capable of both. In the medium-to-long term, the trick is thus to identify such people and work ruthlessly to get them into the right places. National leaders and politicians who fail to do this will have to accept the blame for future politico-military failures.
I think we can also do better in the short term. Here the responsibility for improvement lies in the hands of those who create and execute strategy now, be they politicians, diplomats, officials or military officers. The simple solution is self-education. Strategic leaders and strategists must work to understand strategy making in theory and they must work to apply rigour when strategy making in practice -- for those vested with the power to commit military forces to armed conflict and war, this responsibility is not formal but is fundamental.
To help bring more understanding and rigour to our strategy making, I have tried here to bring back into contemporary consciousness and distil the thinking of distinguished theorists and practitioners past. I have also set out complementary ideas based on corporate theory, military doctrine, personal insight and arguments from first principles. But, whether or not I have enhanced our body of knowledge, strategy making will never be easy. And with matters of high politics and war and with people's lives, at stake it feels right that it is not. But it also feels right to suggest that, when we choose to use armed force, our thinking to underpin operations should be as rigorous as humanly possible.
What then are the key lessons herein for strategy makers who wish to add rigour? They emerge naturally from the main structure of our analysis of strategy making in history, theory and practice.
Two lessons from the history of strategy sit above the individual insights. First, we must recognize the cumulative influence that historical ideas exert on our thinking today, often in ways more subliminal than conscious. This leads us to the second lesson. Those who are -- or aspire to be -- strategy makers must know and understand this body of thought. Part II provides an introduction, but it is not a substitute for further study, at least not for those of conscience.
Two further lessons emerge from the theory of politico-military strategy making. First, if we choose to use state power, including armed force, to achieve a political object, then the rational way for us to do so is to create and execute a superior strategy. We are more likely to create superior strategy with a rigorous approach, for example using the frameworks and tools of Part III -- but noting that these are aids, not substitutes, for hard thinking. This leads us to the second lesson, which draws on the Strategic Estimate. If we want to make superior strategy, we need to start our strategy making by answering two key questions: 'What is the political issue at contest?' and, 'What is the desired political object?' In other words, before we make a decision to fight, we must know what we will be fighting about and we must know what we want to achieve by fighting.
Two final lessons emerge in Part IV from the practice of strategy making. First, because of war's irrational nature, no matter how much rigour we use when we make strategy, events are unlikely to unfold as we envisage: 'No plan survives contact with the enemy.' Because of this, the very way we think will need to vary in different stages in our strategy making. A more prescriptive approach will be better as we create the strategy. A more reflective approach will be better as we execute the strategy. But these different ways of thinking are complementary, not alternatives. Second, sad to say, but processes matter. The principles I have proposed for a politico-military school of strategy making can help codify these processes. Through the act of codification, states and institutions can start to judge if their strategy making processes work and, if necessary, make changes. Improved processes will be no substitute for good people but, without improvement, the danger is that strategy making will remain a disorganized, undisciplined intellectual activity.
The bottom line lesson, probably more important than all others is that ultimately, it's all about people. Poor strategy is the result of errors of thinking. And people are the source of the thinking. So, if an operation or war is going badly, we need to look critically not only at our strategy but also at our senior people, political, diplomatic, civil and military and decide whether the source of the problem is broader than the strategy and, if necessary, be ruthless in making changes.
It will be interesting, in time, to see how history judges the strategies, the strategy making and the strategy makers of the modern campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. How will results measure up against our three tests of superior strategy: effectiveness, efficiency and durability of result? I suspect that, in the sober light of historical analysis, pluses and minuses will emerge. The school report of history may record areas where we 'could do better'. Certainly as a participant I would feel honour bound to examine a 'could do better' charge. But this book is not about salving a conscience. Rather it is an attempt to explore the question: if superior strategy is key to success in the great strategic endeavours of our time, how could we do better? As such the recent past should be of interest to us not for apportioning blame but rather as a source of insights to allow us to 'do better', to create and execute more effective strategy in the future. And we need to be prompt in learning these lessons because today's strategic leaders and strategists have work to do.
What we sometimes forget about strategy is that not only does it matter -- but very often it matters now. When we get it wrong, we may fail to achieve critical political objectives. Precious and sometimes irreplaceable resources may be squandered. And too many will pay in blood. So I hope that scholars will forgive the flaws and roughness herein. Some of the theory feels raw and must be challenged. But for now my colleagues at the strategic level and their agents in the tactical field, are the ones who need our help, those people whose faces are marred by the dust and sweat and blood of the strategic arena.
Some say making strategy is easy. I simply do not agree. Nor does history. If it were easy, surely we would always be successful? Surely the campaigns in the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq would have played out as their designers intended? Rather, as I said at the outset, strategy making is problem-solving of the most complex order because it deals with three of life's great imponderables, people, war and the future. But this does not mean that it is not susceptible to hard thinking. Indeed the historical record seems to shows that hard thinking by talented people is the cornerstone of strategic success. But, to better focus our hard thinking, we will need to turn strategy making into something other than Admiral Wylie's 'disorganized, undisciplined activity'. And if the theory presented in this book helps those creating and executing strategy do so in a more organized and disciplined way, my work will be done.

This is an extract from Commodore Steven Jermy's new book, Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century. If you liked it, why not buy the book from Amazon or any major book retailer.

About the Author

This article is an extract from Commodore Steven Jermy RN's new book, Strategy For Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century. Find out more by visiting http://www.knightstone-publishing.co.uk/books/strategyforaction.html

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Effect of stimulating Magnetic field on Plants

Effect of stimulating magnetic field on plants

R.V.K. Charan

Department of Physics, Gaya College, Gaya, Bihar, India - 823001

E-mail- rvkcharan@rediffmail.com

Short Note

A plant's metabolism contains 90-95% of water which is a diamagnetic compound and the rest contains several para, ferro & diamagnetic metals and non-metals in minute forms. So, if a plant is placed in an oscillatory magnetic field the para & ferro-magnetics oscillate in their magnetic moment along the field by tracing the hysteresis curve according to Currie & Wiess Law1 where as the dia-magnetics oscillate opposing the field in perpendicular direction by obeying the dehass-Van Alphan theory2. But, the para & ferro oscillate with temporary magnetisation i.e. the magnetic retentivity i.e. not freely where as dia-magnetics oscillate without any such magnetic retentivity i.e. quite freely. Thus, the dia-magnetics which form 90-95% of the plant constituent dominate in the oscillation with the result that the water dependent action gets excited. Thus, the rate of ascent of sap increases which creats the plant pulsation. Now, if the oscillating magnetic field is made stimulatory then the plant's pulse rate increases abruptly.

An experiment3 was done with a mesophytic plant by keeping it in an electromagnetic solenoid with an arrangement to oscillate and stimulate its magnetic field at any desired (low) frequency where as a similar plant was kept outside as comparing . In the circuit arrangement the oscillatory square pulsating field was made stimulating by breaking the continuous oscillatory field as damped i.e. rising to peak and receding abruptly. The frequency of the oscillation was set at 40 C/S and the total magnitude of the magnetic field, as given, was 178.93 oersteds. Out of this magnitude, 91.99 oersteds was the oscillating where as 5.19 remained constant in the first phase. Due to this the para & ferro magnetics get permanent magnetic retentivity or residual magnetism whereas the dia-magnetics do not retain any magnetic retentivity, as stated above. Such stimulatory magnetic field was applied for 45minutes. It has been observed with the help of a CRO that the plant's pulse rate, at first, increases in the oscillation but then rises abruptly due to the stimulation . At the same time the other comparing plant remains same for long even after lapse of the 45 minutes. The rise in the pulse rate is obviously due to stimulatory magnatic effect on the dia-magnetic water. It has been further observed that the pulsating curve remained almost same in the different region of the cortex. It has been also observed that if the experimental plant is taken out from its soil i.e. no soil remains to the root and placed under the stimulatory magnetic field, then due to the high pulse-rate chlorophyll synthesis stops after about an hour with increasing of xanthophyll synthesis, resulting in finally wilting of the leaves after getting yellowed. This is certainly because of non-availability of water for pulsation.

Inference : From the above result it can be inferred that if plant is placed in a stimulating magnetic field the rise of their pulse rate may enhance their growth without use of any fertilizers or any chemicals which affects the natural vitamins and carbohydrates essential for the mankind, if the plant is for human consumption. A correlation can be established in between the plant pulsation and the applied field.

References :

  1. J.B. Rajam, Atomic Physics, 7th Edition, 1984, P-71
  2. Sexena, Gupta & Sexena, Solid State Physics, 15th Edition, 1966, P-595
  3. Charan R.V.K. Effect of Oscillating Magnetic field on plants, Ind. J. Theo. Phy, Kolkata, India, Vol. 57, 2009